Law School: Events

JSI Seminar | On the nature of legal reasoning: Rules, knowledge and concepts
2025-04-03 13:00 - 14:00 (Australia/Sydney)
This seminar is part of a larger work on legal reasoning. The seminar focuses on three aspects of our reasoning capabilities, to provide a sense of the intellectual territory we inhabit when we engage in legal reasoning. The seminar presents a broadly Wittgensteinian approach to rules and rule-following and the nature of knowledge, in particular the distinction between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ and the relationship between the two. Lastly, it considers the ‘concept’ of concepts and of legal concepts in particular, and the vexed question of whether ‘conceptual analysis’ has any role to play in legal reasoning.

About the speaker

James Penner (B.Sc (Genetics) University of Western Ontario (1985), LLB University of Toronto (1988), DPhil Oxford (1992)) is Kwa Geok Choo Professor of Property Law at the University of Singapore, which he joined in 2013. He formerly taught at Brunel University, the London School of Economics, King’s College London, and University College London. He is one of the world’s leading scholars in the philosophy of property and the law of trusts, and writes more widely in the areas of private law and the philosophy of law. He has been a visiting professor at the University of Alberta, the University of Queensland, Queen’s University (Canada), Jilin University, the Catholic University of Leuven, the University of Toronto and Harvard University and, most recently, at the Centre for Transnational Legal Studies in London.

Thursday 3 April

Time: 1-2pm

Venue: Common Room, Level 4, New Law Building, Eastern Avenue, University of Sydney, Camperdown campus

CPD Points: 1

This event is proudly presented by the Julius Stone Institute of Jurisprudence at The University of Sydney Law School.

Julius Stone Address: Legal practice and the responsibility of individuals
2025-04-09 18:00 - 19:30 | Law Foyer, Level 2, New Law Building (F10), University of Sydney, Camperdown Campus
In-person event

Some legal practices, such as the private law of obligations and property, are justified by the good that general compliance with their rules bring about. It cannot be said, however, that each particular act of compliance by individuals itself contributes to that good outcome. And yet there is clearly an ethical tie between individuals and the rules of the practices. Leaving aside cases where the law simply protects independent moral rights, the same points can be made about compliance with law generally. This lecture explores the question of how we should understand the ethical tie between individuals and legal practices that are justified in terms of the social good produced by general compliance. An imperfect duty of impartial beneficence will play a central role in the account.

About the speaker

Liam Murphy works in legal, moral, and political philosophy and the application of these inquiries to law, legal institutions, and legal theory. Subjects of his publications range from abstract questions of moral philosophy (for example, “Nonlegislative Justification,” in Jeff McMahan et al., Principles and Persons: The Legacy of Derek Parfit, 2021) to concrete issues of legal and economic policy (for example, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice, 2002, co-authored with Thomas Nagel). A central theme in all Murphy’s work is that legal, moral, and political theory cannot be pursued independently of one another; they are, in fact, different dimensions of a single subject. This theme is evident in his book What Makes Law (2014), which locates the traditional philosophical issue of the grounds of law (the factors that determine the content of the law in force) within broader issues of political theory.

Much of Murphy’s recent work has been in the field of private law theory, though he has also recently returned to tax policy, writing a new paper with Thomas Nagel on wealth taxation. Going forward, Murphy is working on a book project that concerns the connections and differences among the justifications of practices (including legal practices) and the moral requirements that apply to individuals, collectives of individuals, and states. Murphy has been awarded fellowships at Columbia’s Society of Fellows in the Humanities, Harvard’s Society of Fellows, and the National Humanities Center. He was vice dean of NYU School of Law from 2007 to 2010.

Wednesday 9 April 2025

Time: 6-7.30pmVenue: Law Foyer, Level 2, New Law Building

This event is hosted by the Julius Stone Institute of Jurisprudence at The University of Sydney Law School.

The Julius Stone Address is generously sponsored by the Educational Heritage Foundation. It is named to commemorate the life and work of Professor Julius Stone, Australia’s foremost legal philosopher and for many years Challis Professor of International Law and Jurisprudence at The University of Sydney.
